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ABSTRACT 
Effects of executive functioning on false memory in children 
By Pamela Swift (Tessier), M.S. 
Misremembering is a common phenomenon in normal human development that 
has great potential to become problematic, especially in legal situations. The 
Deese/Roediger–McDermott (DRM; Deese, 1959; Roediger & McDermott, 1995) model 
has been commonly used in the literature to uncover mechanisms for why these false 
memories may occur. Children have only recently begun to be investigated using this 
paradigm. Some related mechanisms in children for false recollection that have yet to be 
investigated are child executive functioning and socioeconomic status. In the current 
study, executive functioning was investigated as a potential mechanism for false 
recollections using a DRM paradigm. Children completed a brief assessment of 
intelligence followed by assessments of executive functioning. Participants then engaged 
in the DRM recall and recognition task. Finally, they completed a semantic knowledge 
task. Results indicated that specific aspects of executive functioning (inhibition and 
cognitive flexibility) predicted false memory production at both recall and recognition. 
Additionally, maternal education and gross family income had predictive value at recall 
and recognition. However, a mediational model was not supported. These results help 
explain mechanisms for false memory and can provide valuable information regarding 
susceptibility to false memory production. 
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Effects of executive functioning on false memory in children 
Misremembering is a common phenomenon throughout the lifespan. People of all 
ages are prone to false recollection of names, lists, places, and so on (e.g., Metzger et al., 
2008; Gold et al., 2007; Sugrue & Hayne, 2006). Misremembering may not be a terribly 
detrimental event; falsely remembering that one needs to purchase sugar at the grocery 
store is not going to have a dramatic impact on a person’s life or the life of another. 
However, false memory becomes far more important when it occurs in a legal context. 
For instance, in eyewitness memory reports, a false memory has potential to influence 
court cases in a significant way. Thus, regardless of the usual banality of false memories 
in everyday life, their considerable impact in legal contexts warrants extensive 
investigation. And, over and above the false memory itself, more inquiry into the 
correlates (i.e., the neurocognitive correlates) of their production could result in valuable 
information that may point further mechanisms for the induction of false memories. 
False Memory 
Several theories have been put forth to describe the how false memories occur. Of 
these, Fuzzy-Trace Theory (Brainerd & Reyna, 2004; Reyna & Brainerd, 1995) accounts 
for the most parsimonious explanation for false memory development.  Fuzzy-Trace 
Theory states that, following an event, people are able to unearth two distinct memory 
traces; verbatim and gist. The verbatim trace, or the verbatim memory for stimuli, 
includes specific features of events such as perceptual features. The gist trace is schema-
based or contains the overall theme of the presented words. When the verbatim trace 
fades, the gist trace takes over and false memories are more likely to occur. For example, 
after being presented with a verbal narrative that did not mention how a college student 
FALSE MEMORY IN CHILDREN 2 
learned of the death of his family dog, one-week later verbatim memory had faded such 
that numerous participants could no longer recall the narrative word for word (verbatim 
trace). Gist memory took over and numerous adult participants falsely recalled that he 
learned the news via receiving a phone call from his parents (raw data from Krackow, 
Kania, & Travers, 2013).  Fuzzy-Trace Theory is not specific to a single paradigm but 
applies more generally to memory development and applies to a variety of cognitive 
processes.  Findings consistent with predictions based on Fuzzy-Trace Theory appear in 
the literature on development of memory (Brainerd, Reyna, & Howe, 2009), false 
memories (Holliday, Brainerd & Reyna, 2010), false confessions (Reyna, Holliday, & 
Marche, 2002) and in other domains of cognition such as risky decision making (Reyna 
et al., 2011) and cognitive functioning in Alzheimer’s disease (Brainerd et al., 2011).  
The application of Fuzzy-Trace Theory to common procedures used to induce false 
memories is reviewed below.  
Leading Questions and Misinformation 
Elizabeth Loftus, a pioneer in the field of eyewitness memory research, began 
considering how false memories came about four decades ago (Loftus & Palmer, 1974). 
Loftus went on to discover methods for inducing false memories, including the use of 
leading questioning. Loftus (1975) conducted a series of experiments with nearly 500 
undergraduate students at the University of Washington with the premise that simple 
changes in the wording of a question may induce a false memory. Loftus was one of the 
first researchers to consider the importance of transitioning memory research from word 
lists to actual events. Loftus cited her own published and unpublished research which 
suggested that memories regarding events, whether they be benign (e.g., one’s history of 
FALSE MEMORY IN CHILDREN 3 
headaches) or a recently viewed car accident, were highly influenced based on the 
wording of questions (“about how fast were the cars going when they 
bumped/hit/smashed into each other?” p. 565). Stronger words (e.g., smashed) elicited 
responses indicating higher speeds of the cars. If one accepts the leading terms of the 
question, then that portion is incorporated into their memory. Later on, one may respond 
to questions based on this construction that has the false memory in tow. In sum, Loftus 
describes memory process as forming a cognitive representation of an experience 
followed by a cognitive modification of that experience when additional information is 
encountered.  When this original event is remembered, the newly formed representation 
is what is recalled as opposed to the original experience.  This can lead to erroneous 
responses if questioned about the original experience. If, during acquisition, a falsity is 
introduced and accepted, later retrieval will result in the revival of that false memory.  
Loftus furthered this line of investigation to discover that misinformation can be 
used in other ways, aside from leading questions, to create false memories. The 
misinformation paradigm generally includes three steps: experiencing or hearing about an 
event (presentation stage), receiving information following the event (suggestion stage), 
and a test of memory (test stage) (Loftus, 2005a; Loftus, 1975). The induction of false 
memories is robust using this type of paradigm in both adults and children (Bruck & 
Ceci, 1999; Ceci, Ross, & Toglia, 1987).  Fuzzy-Trace Theory explains false memories in 
this paradigm as the original event presented (verbatim trace) diminishes and the 
suggested post-event information becomes incorporated into the memory trace. After this 
occurs, the schema-based memory for the event takes over (gist memory) and is recalled.  
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Implanted Autobiographical Memory  
 Of particular concern in legal cases are implanted, or “repressed/recovered,” 
autobiographical memories (Loftus, 1993). Memories of this type include recollections 
for whole events that one believes they have experienced or witnessed. Several studies 
have considered the situations and conditions where false autobiographical memories can 
be implanted.  The general methodology used across studies is that participants are 
provided with a cover story of some sort to increase the likelihood that they will believe 
the false memory induction (i.e., to make it plausible).  Memories are implanted using a 
variety of memory implantation techniques, often techniques used by memory recovery 
therapists (Lynn, Lock, Loftus, Krackow, & Lilienfeld, 2003) such as guided imagery, 
and participants are asked to report these memories aloud.  For example, Mazzoni and 
Memon (2003) provided participants with a bogus cover story about a made up medical 
procedure that supposedly occurred when the adult participants were young children.  
The researchers then used imagination to recover memories of this childhood event. Forty 
percent of participants in the condition produced false memories, which was substantially 
higher than a control condition.  Therefore in these studies and in real world memory 
recovery cases, autobiographical memories, including memories from childhood, are 
weak. Recollections that coincide with the gist memory are created via presentation of a 
cover story that includes some specific details of the event.  The person is then left with 
the feeling that this event may have occurred (it becomes “familiar” according to 
Brainerd & Reyna, 2002) and generates specific details consistent with the suggested gist 
(Brainerd & Reyna, 2002).  In the real world, this process is magnified by numerous 
sessions in which memory recovery takes place, including expectancies that the client 
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will be able to recall the traumatic event (Lynn et al., 2003).  The person then comes to 
believe this false memory.   
Deese/ Roediger/ McDermott False Memory Methodology and Related Theory 
The Deese/ Roediger/ McDermott (DRM) methodology has been regularly and 
reliably used to study the production of false memories (Howe, 2005; Roediger & 
McDermott, 1995). This methodology utilizes lists that contain words that can all be 
categorized under a larger categorical term such as a basic level term (Blewitt & 
Krackow, 1992).  For example, a list may contain items like Dalmatian, collie, English 
setter, boxer, but will not include the word “dog.” Despite this larger, categorical term 
being left off the list, older children (Metzger et al., 2008) and adults (Howe, 2005; 
Sugrue & Hayne, 2006) have a consistent, strong tendency to remember that basic-level 
word. False memory for the “critical lure” is referred to as the DRM effect.   
False memories produced by the DRM effect are consistent with the most 
parsimonious theory of false memory development, Fuzzy-Trace Theory (Brainerd & 
Reyna, 2004; Reyna & Brainerd, 1995). Findings using the DRM model reveal that older 
children and adults tend to exhibit higher rates of false memories than younger children 
(Holliday, Brainerd, & Reyna, 2011).  This phenomenon is referred to developmental 
reversals in false memories (Holliday et al., 2011).  Fuzzy-Trace Theory has been used to 
explain what is deemed the developmental reversal phenomenon; both verbatim and gist 
memory increase with age, but it is the increase in gist memory that leads to 
reconstructive memory processes (Holliday et al., 2011).    
A second theory provides another explanation specifically for DRM false 
memories, essentially suggesting that as individual’s age, they are more likely to activate 
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memory systems that make them more capable of false memory. Association Activation 
Theory (Howe, 2006) suggests that the critical lure in a DRM paradigm is activated via 
semantic networks after reading the list items. Words that are more highly associated 
with the critical lure would thus be more likely to activate semantic networks and lead to 
false memory. These theories ultimately fit with evidence indicating that young children 
are less prone to the DRM effect since they activate different memory networks than 
older children and adults. Howe, Wimmer, and Blease (2009) assessed Association 
Activation Theory, specifically backward associative strength, using DRM and 
categorical lists. Backward associative strength refers to the strength between items in the 
DRM list and the critical lure. They hypothesized that backward associative strength 
would be key in false memory production. Using DRM lists (e.g., for the critical lure 
bird- nest, fly, feathers) and category lists (e.g., bluejay, canary, eagle). Participants read 
lists that were either categorical or DRM and either high, low, or equal in backward 
associative strength. They discovered that false recall and recognition of these lists 
increased (regardless of whether they were categorical or DRM) as backward associative 
strength increased. This corroborated the assumptions of Association Activation Theory. 
A third theory for false memories in the DRM methodology was developed by 
Roediger and McDermott (2000).  They explained this in a similar manner to Association 
Activation Theory and referred to this theory as Activation-Monitoring Theory. They 
described a similar mechanism by which, upon being presented with the list, individuals 
activated the critical lure using their semantic networks. Thus, in adults, words with 
strong associations are activated quickly and consistently, leading to heightened true and 
false recall. The added component to their theory was a source-monitoring component, 
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which theoretically would reduce false memories. By making a decision about the source 
of the memory, individuals should be better able to discount critical lures that may have 
been brought to the forefront of their memory by semantic activation.  This second aspect 
of Activation-Monitoring Theory is suspect. Source-monitoring capabilities have been 
found to increase with age (e.g., Roberts, 2000). Thus, logically children would then be 
more prone to false memories. Indeed, this finding has been seen on occasion in the 
literature (see Ghetti, Qin, & Goodman, 2002). However, the majority of research points 
to young children having fewer false memory recollections using the DRM paradigm. 
         Specifically, the DRM methodology can serve as a proxy for real-life event false 
memories. Reyna and colleagues (2007) argued that DRM word lists work in the same 
way that memories for repeated exposure to abuse or neglect work. For example, if a 
child victim of crime experiences similar events over the course of years, recent events 
may cue memories for earlier events. By connecting these events, the details may become 
fuzzy and intertwined. Reyna, Holliday, and Marche (2002) reviewed the implications of 
the dominant theory behind why DRM memories occur (Fuzzy-Trace Theory). They 
contended that Fuzzy-Trace Theory is incredibly pertinent in forensic investigations, 
especially when children are being interviewed with leading questions or open-ended free 
recall. Additionally, Poole (1995) argued that verbatim memories may become 
“gistified.” Specifically, Poole noted that the predominant theory of DRM can be seen in 
other contexts aside from those specifically mentioned in Fuzzy-Trace Theory research. 
Brainerd, Reyna, and Poole, (2000) reasoned in their chapter that DRM and Fuzzy-Trace 
Theory have their place in legal contexts; if a child is put through a round of leading 
questions, the gist for an event may be made more apparent in the process, making their 
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verbatim trace disappear. This is ultimately the same as the events that occur in the DRM 
paradigm. The word list elicits the gist and the verbatim trace cannot discount it.  
Therefore, false memory results from the same processes regardless of whether the 
memory is for a traumatic event or word lists.  
In summary, the preponderance of evidence points to DRM being a valid inductor 
for false memory in research and proxy for real-life event false memories. This is largely 
due to Fuzzy-Trace Theory and the broad reach of the theory in memory research.  
Research using the DRM methodology in adults and children will now be reviewed. 
Initially, research on the DRM false memories using DRM methodology was conducted 
primarily with adults. In recent years, children have been included when studying this 
method of inducing false memories. 
DRM in adults 
The literature on the DRM effect has largely focused on adults. Adults, compared 
to children, are more prone to falsely recalling critical lures when lists are longer (Sugrue 
& Hayne, 2006), but also have more accurate recall (Metzger et al., 2008) suggesting a 
developmental trend; as individuals age, they are not only able to accurately recall words 
at a better rate, they are also more prone to false recall.  
Khanna and Cortese (2009) investigated the importance of presentation modality 
when using DRM lists. Specifically, they assessed children (ages 8-9) and adults’ false 
memories when presenting lists orally and visually. Interestingly, the authors found that, 
with orally presented lists, children had a higher proportion of false to true recall. Adults 
showed the opposite trend. They also found a relatively higher false recall rate in 
children. When using visual (written) lists, adults had higher rates of false and true recall 
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than children. These results suggested that adults process information differently and in a 
more consistent manner than children, regardless of modality, since their proportion and 
relative rates of false memory stayed fairly similar. The authors suggested that when 
studying false memories, information-processing differences must be considered. 
DRM in children 
Relatively recently, researchers have begun to consider how DRM lists may 
impact the memory of children. In general, younger children have been found to be less 
prone to the DRM effect (e.g., Howe 2005; Metzger et al., 2008). This may seem 
counterintuitive, but theories (see above) suggest that this is due to less developed 
language and memory systems. 
Holliday, Reyna, and Brainerd (2008) found a developmental increase in memory 
of critical lures in children ages 7-to-13-years-old. Specifically, 7-year-olds remembered 
significantly fewer lures than older children. It seemed that repetition of lists, as well as 
giving children the theme of the list (different from the critical lure), increased false 
memories as well. Children as old as fifth-graders have been found to make DRM errors 
in a similar manner to adults in low-demand (i.e., recognition) scenarios (Metzger et al., 
2008). As noted previously, Khanna and Cortese (2009) uncovered that 8- to 9-year-olds 
are capable of having proportionately and relatively higher rates of false memory than 
adults. Metzger and colleagues (2008) ran a series of experiments using modified DRM 
lists with words approved by 2nd grade teachers and piloted on children (2nd and 5th 
graders). When using these associative word lists, Metzger et al. (2008) noted an 
advantage; by using developmentally appropriate lists, younger children demonstrated an 
increase in accurate recall and made fewer recall and recognition errors. College students 
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also improved in their false recognition errors when using lists including words approved 
for younger children. 
Children’s remembering capabilities could also be affected by the emotional 
valence of the word list. Howe, Toth, and Cicchetti (2011) considered this important area 
of inquiry with both maltreated and non-maltreated child participants (ages 6-12). 
Memory distortions following trauma are not uncommon (e.g., Cicchetti & Valentino, 
2006) and, should legal proceedings result from trauma, these false or distorted memories 
could be detrimental in court. As per developmental trend, older children recalled more 
words and this occurred regardless of maltreatment history. However, children had a 
harder time suppressing emotional words when told that they should forget the emotional 
list in favor of remembering a second list. Thus, although still capable, children overall 
have a more difficult time suppressing emotional words as opposed to neutral words. To 
summarize, the research suggests that older children and adults are equally susceptible to 
DRM errors and, thus, are potentially likely to exhibit false memories after list 
presentation. 
Individual Differences in False Memories  
 Individual differences are an important area of consideration in regards to how 
false memories are produced. Aside from age, researchers have identified several factors 
that may influence false memory induction on an individual basis. For example, 
individuals who have experienced trauma or sexual abuse in the past (and have notable 
PTSD symptoms) may be more prone to false memories (Goodman et al., 2011). Zhu and 
colleagues (2010b), using a misinformation paradigm, discovered several personality 
dimensions related to false memory, including persistence, cooperativeness, self-
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dependence, reward-directedness, and coping skills. Additionally, depression and 
cognitive abilities were also (negatively) correlated with false memory production (Zhu 
et al., 2010b). Finally, studies have considered how socioeconomic status may affect the 
induction of false memories (Howe, Cicchetti, & Toth, 2004). There is a wealth of 
research still to be done on why false memories are more likely to be produced in one 
person, but not another.  
Nearly all of the studies reviewed below have used an undergraduate population 
and have only begun to scratch the surface of the relationship between 
neuropsychological functioning and false memories. Bixter and Daniel (2013) explored 
the relationship between false recollection and working memory using two different 
experiments; one with a forewarning for participants about the tendency of DRM lists to 
lead to false memories and another where this forewarning was absent. Those participants 
with larger working memory capacity had fewer false memories, but also fewer 
“remember” responses, or responses where the participant consciously recollected the 
word (as opposed to having a “feeling” that it was a word they had seen before), though 
this was only when a forewarning regarding the DRM task occurred.  Peters and 
colleagues (2006) also discovered slight executive dysfunction in undergraduate students 
who tended to falsely remember critical lures. In Howe, Toth, and Cicchetti‘s (2011) 
assessment of both maltreated and non-maltreated children’s memory abilities, they also 
considered verbal and perceptual IQ in order to relate cognitive functioning to these 
inhibitory abilities. They found that children’s verbal IQ was significantly associated with 
their recall rates. When verbal IQ was controlled for, maltreated and non-maltreated 
children had similar recall abilities. Additionally, older children (ages 10-12) were better 
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able to recall true memories than younger children (ages 6-9), but the groups were equal 
in their false memory recall rates. Zhu and colleagues (2010a) assessed the relationship 
between cognitive factors (intelligence, perception, memory, and face judgments) and 
false memories after a misinformation test in college students. The misinformation test 
included a 50-slide story told in pictures, of which 12 were particularly important since 
they were to be inaccurately described in a narration following a 30-minute delay. These 
narrations were 50 sentences, one for each slide, with 12 being inaccurate. Following 
another 10-minute delay, participants completed two tasks; one related to recognition and 
another that assessed source monitoring abilities. Their results suggested that lower 
intelligence and visuospatial skills were linked to increased false recognition memories, 
but that having false memories is not necessarily indicative of simply poor memory in 
general. Specifically, having what researchers deemed “Robust False Memory” (e.g., 
endorsing the pictures as the source of their false memory or saying that the picture and 
the narration were both the same) was not significantly associated with recall and 
recognition tasks on the Wechsler Memory Scales. Additionally, when including other 
cognitive abilities in a regression, memory scores did not uniquely predict false 
recognition memory, suggesting that other areas of cognition should be considered in this 
process. 
Studies have already suggested that working memory capacity is associated with 
false memory induction, but no studies have simultaneously assessed other executive 
function capacities (e.g., cognitive flexibility and inhibition). Tests of inhibition, or the 
ability to control one’s attention in order to ignore or override external lures (Diamond, 
2013) may be associated with false memory, especially in the DRM task. Inhibitory 
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control may be necessary in order to ignore the gist of the DRM list and only recall the 
verbatim list. More broadly, being able to discount and override information from past 
experiences and events is crucial to event reporting as an eyewitness. Additionally, 
cognitive flexibility, which Diamond (2013) conceptualizes as being built from the other 
two areas of executive functioning, may be important in false memory. The ability to 
change focus and perspective is enormously important in legal cases where techniques 
like the cognitive interview, which includes a change perspectives component, are being 
used to obtain a narrative of an event from a child. As a result, having enhanced cognitive 
flexibility makes false memory induction more difficult. Finally, socioeconomic status 
has been demonstrated as having an effect on both executive functioning and false 
memory production; specifically, children from lower socioeconomic status backgrounds 
are more prone to deficits in executive functioning (Carlson & Meltzoff, 2008; Hackman 
& Farah, 2009; Hackman, Farah, & Meaney, 2010) and more false memories (Howe, 
Cicchetti, & Toth, 2006). Thus, socioeconomic status will be an important consideration 
for the current study. 
Executive functioning and socioeconomic status. 
 Executive functioning comprises several cognitive skills including planning, 
working memory, inhibitory control, attention, and cognitive flexibility, among other 
higher-order skills. Executive functioning has been shown to be moderately correlated 
with IQ with ranges, depending on the executive functioning test, of R2 from .14 to .55 
(Arffa, 2007). Recent evidence suggests that socioeconomic status, a proxy for several 
variables related to family income and access to community resources, may impact 
neuropsychological functioning (e.g., Noble, Houston, Kan, & Sowell, 2012; Blair 2010). 
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Noble and colleagues (2012) found that differences in socioeconomic status, over 
and above race, IQ, and gender differences, were highly associated with differences in 
brain volume across the hippocampus and the amygdala. Differences in the left superior 
temporal gyrus and left inferior frontal gyrus were also associated with socioeconomic 
status differences and increased with age. Noble and her colleagues suggested that home 
linguistic environment and stress may be the mechanisms of these variations. Blair 
(2010) discussed the effects of early environmental stress resulting from insufficient 
resources on hormones and neurotransmitters. Blair noted that, for example, heightened 
presence of cortisol could change neural development, altering executive functioning and 
behavioral skills. Additionally, Blair and colleagues (2011) found that higher levels of 
salivary cortisol during infancy and toddlerhood was related to diminished executive 
functioning abilities at age 3. Noble and colleagues (2012) proposed a model by which 
socioeconomic status may impact neurocognitive capabilities, including language 
development, memory, and other aspects of executive functioning. Specifically, they 
suggest that stress and the linguistic environment at home impacts memory, emotion, and 
self-control centers, as well as areas of the brain important for language development in 
the brain (Noble, Houston, Kan, & Sowell, 2012). Additionally, even exposure to stress 
in the prenatal environment can have lasting effects in childhood and adolescence in 
regard to hippocampal volume (Qui et al., 2013), cortical volume (Davis et al., 2013) and 
amygdala volume (Buss et al., 2012). 
The brain areas involved in executive functioning processes (e.g., the prefrontal 
cortex) do not tend to reach full development until the early 30s (e.g., Watson et al., 
2011). Researchers have suggested that this slow postnatal maturation may make 
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individuals more susceptible to environmental influences, including the effects of low 
environmental resources from growing up in a low socioeconomic status family 
(Hackman & Farah, 2009; Hackman, Farah, & Meaney, 2010). Recently, Nesbitt, Baker-
Ward, and Willoughby (2013) examined executive functioning as a mediator in the 
relationship between socioeconomic status and race on academic achievement. 
Socioeconomic status and racial identity did not have any direct effect on mathematic or 
literary achievement outcomes, but worked indirectly through kindergarten executive 
functioning. Specifically, higher socioeconomic status and being of European (rather than 
African American) descent was related to higher kindergarten executive functioning, 
which led to higher math and literary achievement.  
Historically, socioeconomic status has been an incredibly difficult construct to 
measure. The APA Task Force on Socioeconomic Status (2007) has largely recognized 
the difficulties inherent with measuring socioeconomic status and has called for 
psychologists to consider this construct carefully in research and practice. A recent 
review suggested that the use of composite measures of socioeconomic status (e.g., the 
Hollingshead Index of Social Position) are inappropriate as they are unable to pinpoint 
the driving force for differences in data (Diemer et al., 2012). Rather, these measures 
compile multiple aspects into one score (i.e., parental education, household income, 
occupational prestige, etc.) and tell the user little about how each specific aspect of 
socioeconomic status is changing the results. Thus, the literature suggests that a more 
appropriate strategy is to ask multiple questions relating to different aspects of 
socioeconomic status and to analyze these separately to ensure that important information 
is not lost during analyses (Diemer et al., 2012). 
FALSE MEMORY IN CHILDREN  16 
To summarize, both socioeconomic status and executive functioning have clear, 
far-reaching effects on many areas of child development including memory and, without 
including them both, it would be difficult to ascertain the true contribution of one towards 
false memory production.  
Semantic knowledge. 
 Semantic or verbal fluency tasks are those that require participants to name as 
many objects as they can that fit into a category within some time limit (Lezak, 1995) or 
by categorizing pictorial images. In adults, links have been made between semantic 
fluency and false memory production. Specifically, Koutsaal and colleagues (2003) had 
healthy younger and older adults study and then identify ambiguous (e.g., drawn and then 
slightly altered via software) pictures of common items. In some conditions the pictures 
were labeled with the item’s category prior to item presentation while in other conditions 
the objects went unlabeled. They found that older adults in the labeled condition were 
more prone to false recognition and identified previously unseen objects as studied 
objects. Gold and colleagues (2007) mimicked this procedure and noted similar results 
for Alzheimer’s disease patients; those with Alzheimer’s disease tended to identify more 
objects as previously seen, resulting in higher rates of false recognition. The authors 
suggested that the increase in false recognition may be due to dysfunction in either the 
hippocampus at memory retention or the prefrontal cortex at memory retrieval. Joubert 
and colleagues (2010) noted cortical degeneration of the anterior temporal lobe and the 
inferior prefrontal cortex in patients with amnestic mild cognitive impairment and in 
those with Alzheimer’s disease, partially supporting Gold and colleague’s (2007) 
suggestions. In another study with participants who ranged from young adult to older 
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adults with mild dementia of the Alzheimer’s type, there was an increase noted in false 
recall as a function of age and dementia, as well as a proportional increase in false recall 
to correct recall with age and dementia (Watson, Balota, & Sergent-Marshall, 2001).  
Several studies have aimed to identify links between brain disease or 
developmental disorder with verbal fluency (e.g., Bourke et al., 2011; Anderson et al., 
2002). This is accomplished typically by administering the COWAT and having children 
name as many items as they can starting with a specific letter (e.g., F, A, or S; Benton, 
Hamsher, & Sivan, 1983). For example, Anderson and colleagues (2002) showed that 
children with frontal lesions did comparatively worse than children with phenylketonuria, 
hydrocephalus, or control children. This suggests the importance of the frontal lobe in 
verbal fluency in children as well. Children with heavy prenatal alcohol exposure 
performed significantly worse than counterparts with ADHD and control on the COWAT 
letter fluency test. In semantic (category) fluency, children exposed to alcohol prenatally 
continued to have a significantly worse performance than peers with ADHD and 
marginally worse than the control group (Vaurio, Riley, & Mattson, 2008). Additionally, 
a trending relationship between severity of hypoxia and verbal fluency was noted among 
children with varying degrees of sleep disordered breathing (Bourke et al., 2011). 
Of note, no studies known to this author have examined how semantic knowledge 
specifically may predict false memories in typically developing children and adolescents 
using word lists. Importantly, if semantic knowledge is heavily relied upon, false recall 
and recognition may be more common in children and adolescents. 
The current study will examine executive functioning and false memory induction 
in children with at least average intelligence.  Specifically, three aspects of executive 
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functioning will be examined: working memory, cognitive flexibility, and inhibition.  
Two age groups of children will be included in order to examine whether executive 
functioning impacts the expected pattern of developmental reversals in false memories.  
As the aforementioned literature suggests, socioeconomic status is an important 
consideration for both false memory and executive functioning. Thus, socioeconomic 
status will also be examined as a potential mediator in the relationship between executive 
functioning and false memory production. Additionally, semantic knowledge will be 
considered as a driving force in this relationship. 
Hypotheses and Exploratory Questions 
Hypothesis 1 and 2 
Younger children (ages 7 and 8) will have lower false recall rates of the critical 
lure in the DRM task than older children (ages 12 and 13). Older children will, however, 
perform more accurately on the recognition task. 
 Rationale. 
The conclusion in DRM research is that younger children will be less likely to 
falsely recall the critical lures and older children will have better recognition on the DRM 
recognition task (Howe, Toth, & Cicchetti, 2011; Metzger et al., 2008; Sugrue & Hayne, 
2006).  
Hypothesis 3 and 4 
Children with better executive functioning will perform more accurately on the 
recognition task, meaning that they will accurately recognize a greater number of 
previously presented words, and will make fewer recognition errors involving never 
presented words.   
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Rationale. 
Children with better executive functioning skills (inhibition, working memory, 
and cognitive flexibility) may also be better able to resist false responses and discount 
them as words not seen on DRM lists.  
Hypothesis 5 
Children from higher socioeconomic status backgrounds will perform more 
accurately on the DRM recognition task.  
Rationale. 
Howe and colleagues (2004) found that children from low socioeconomic status 
backgrounds performed significantly worse than children from middle socioeconomic 
status backgrounds on a DRM recognition task.  
Exploratory Question 1 
Will socioeconomic status predict false memories for the critical lure? Howe and 
colleagues (2004) examined false memory responses to the critical lure at recall and did 
not find significant differences between low and middle socioeconomic status children. 
Exploratory Question 2 
Will socioeconomic status mediate the relationship between executive functioning 
and false memories, if one is found to exist in the above analyses? 
Exploratory Question 3 
 Will performance on the COWAT account for the differences in memory 
performance (i.e., will semantic processing skills account for false memory production)? 
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Method 
Participants 
 IRB approval was obtained from West Virginia University. Participants (N = 62) 
included children from two age groups; middle childhood (ages 7 and 8; 2nd and 3rd 
grade; n = 30) and early adolescents (ages 12 and 13; 7th and 8th grade; n = 32). These age 
groups will be described as “younger” and “older” children in subsequent results and 
discussion. One younger child’s data was removed from analyses as this child’s data were 
deemed uninterpretable due to parent interjections and interruptions throughout testing. 
Two children had a WASI-II score in the below average range (FSIQ < 85) and were not 
included in analyses. Additionally, several children (n = 7) were noted as having a history 
of a psychological disorder (ADHD = 4, Learning Disorder = 1, Sensory Processing 
Disorder = 1, Tourette’s Syndrome = 1). These children were ultimately included in 
analyses as their results on measures of intellectual ability and executive functioning did 
not differ significantly from their peers (all ps > .05). Thus, the number of older children 
included was n = 31 and younger children was n = 28. Groups were relatively even with 
regard to gender (total males = 32, females = 27) and most were Caucasian (n = 57; 
93.2%). Children were recruited from the greater Morgantown and central/northern 
Vermont communities and came from a range of socioeconomic status backgrounds (e.g., 
Gross Family Income range = $0-$14,999 to $200,000 or more; M = 7.34, SD = 2.892; 
for reference, 7 = $90,000 - $99,999, 8 = $100,000 - $124,999). No geographic 
differences were noted with regard to gross family income or child FSIQ (ps > .05), 
however a difference was noted in age and maternal education with older children being 
recruited from the Morgantown community (t = 2.187, p = .033) and mothers from the 
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Morgantown community having higher education (t = 2.571, p = .0064). Of the 59 
participants, 18 of them were sibling pairs. Analyses regarding sibling effects suggested 
very low effect sizes for all of the false memory outcome variables (Cohen’s ds range =  
.040 to .052). Table 1 includes a complete breakdown of demographic information by 
younger and older child age groups.  
Materials 
DRM word lists. 
The six normed lists from Metzger and colleagues (2008; modified from Roediger 
& McDermott, 1995) were included. These lists were modified to increase the chance 
that young children were familiar with each word in the presented list. Each of the 6 lists 
contained eight words.  These materials were selected because they contain words that 
are normed for children in this age range and because the expected patterns of memory 
findings consistent with the majority of other studies occurred using these stimuli 
(developmental reversals in false memory, developmental reversals in recognition). 
Delayed Recognition 
The same DRM word lists were incorporated into a recognition task to assess 
delayed memory for critical lures. A word list containing 108 words was created using 
validated DRM lists, both presented and unpresented (Metzger et al., 2008).  
Semantic knowledge. 
As a test to see whether semantic and conceptual knowledge is the true driving 
force behind the developmental reversal phenomenon, children were asked to complete 
the Controlled Oral Word Association Test (COWAT; Benton, Hamsher, & Sivan, 1983). 
In order to establish that participants in this study viewed the basic-level terms as being 
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categorical exemplars or associates to the critical lure, the first ten participants completed 
a matching task where they were asked to read a word and then choose the category it 
best matched with. This was created using all of the words from the DRM lists as well as 
words from other normed DRM lists not used in this study. Since participants performed 
well on this task (M = 80.7% correct matches), we substituted this task for a simpler, 
briefer task, the COWAT. The COWAT allowed for the examination of a semantic 
activation correlate to false memories. Essentially, since the participants were able to 
perform well on this task, it indicated that some semantic knowledge existed and that the 
words could be judged as belonging to their appropriate category. The COWAT has an 
added bonus of pre-existing norms for most of these age groups. However, no norms 
exist for age 13, so age 13 data for this study was calculated based upon the 12-year-old 
norms (Halperin et al., 1989). Children were asked to list verbally all of the animals they 
could in one minute (norms exist) followed by all of the vegetables they could in one 
minute (no norms currently exist). 
Intelligence. 
Previous research has suggested that poor performance on tests of intellectual 
ability may be related to poorer executive functioning (Barbey et al., 2012; Brydges et al., 
2012) and memory (Allen, Martin, & Martin, 2012), though this research has been mixed 
(Arffa, 2007; Friedman et al., 2006; Ackerman et al., 2005). IQ was also used as a rule-
out; if participants scored below one standard deviation from the average they were 
removed from further analyses. Each participant was administered the two-subtests form 
of the Wechsler Abbreviated Scales of Intelligence, Second Edition (WASI-II; Wechsler, 
2011). Each participant completed the Matrix Reasoning and Vocabulary subtests. These 
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two subtests load onto a Full Scale IQ score to give an estimate of intellectual ability. 
Matrix Reasoning is an assessment of perceptual reasoning skills and Vocabulary is a 
measure of verbal comprehension. 
Executive functioning.  
The Digit Span subtest of the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children, Fourth 
Edition (WISC-IV; Wechsler, 2004) served as a test of working memory, an important 
aspect of executive functioning. In addition, two measures from the Developmental 
Neuropsychological Assessment, Second Edition (NEPSY-II; Korkman, Kirk & Kemp, 
2007a, 2007b) were administered to assess what Diamond (2013) deemed as the core 
components to executive functioning; working memory, inhibition, and cognitive 
flexibility. As stated, working memory was covered in the Digit Span subtest of the 
WISC-IV, specifically Digit Span Backwards. For inhibition, the Inhibition subtest of the 
NEPSY-II was administered. Inhibition requires the child to give a novel response in 
favor of an automatic response. Specifically, they must first say the exact shape or 
directional arrow they see on a screen, then they must inhibit the automatic response to 
say the opposite. Finally, for cognitive flexibility, Animal Sorting of the NEPSY-II was 
administered. This task requires the child to sort cards into two piles, based upon sorting 
rules, of four cards each.  
Demographics. 
After the parent and child completed the consent and assent forms, respectively, 
the parent was asked to fill out a questionnaire regarding demographics, income, and 
parent education to serve as a proxy for socioeconomic status. Parents were also asked to 
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endorse or deny nonspecific history of psychological disorder, head injury, or O2 
deprivation history for their child.  
Procedure 
 Following parental and consent and child assent one parent completed the 
demographic form.  Children were then administered the WASI-II and executive 
functioning assessment battery on an individual basis by a graduate student (all 
completed by PS).  First, they completed the WASI-II subtests; Matrix Reasoning and 
Vocabulary. Following this task, each child then completed the two tests of executive 
functioning of the NEPSY-II, Animal Sorting and Inhibition. They completed the WISC-
IV Digit Span subtest following the NEPSY-II. Both the NEPSY-II tests and the Digit 
Span subtest were completed on Apple iPads using Q-Interactive software (NCS Pearson, 
Inc., 2016). One iPad was designated as the Examiner iPad and contained software for 
creating clients, designing test batteries, conducting the assessments, and reviewing 
results. The other iPad was designated as the Client iPad and was only used for the 
Inhibition subtest of the NEPSY-II. The Client iPad displayed the sample and test 
patterns of shapes or arrows, which the child was required to identify. During testing, 
results screens were skipped so as to avoid any bias introduction into the study. 
Next, children were given basic instructions regarding the DRM memory task 
(Metzger et al., 2008).  They were told that words would be presented on an audio 
recorder and that they would need to try to remember as many words as they can once the 
recording is done. Accordingly, they were instructed to listen carefully prior to the tape 
recorder being turned on.  Participants listened to each of the 6 word lists containing 8 
words each on a recording. Words were read clearly and loudly by this author at a speed 
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of one word every two seconds. After each list, the child was immediately asked to recall 
as many words as they could.  Afterwards, the second list was presented, followed by 
recall for that list. This continued in such a pattern until all six lists had been read.  
Similar to previous research (e.g., Holliday et al., 2011), children participated in a filler 
task for 30-seconds involving addition problems in order not to interfere with semantic 
processing.  
Finally, for the delayed recognition task, children were read some words that were 
previously presented and some new words that were not previously presented out loud.  
They were then asked to verbally respond ‘yes’ to words they were presented with 
previously and ‘no’ to words that they believed were not presented on the audio 
recording. This recognition list included 108 words, as per Metzger and colleagues 
(2008); (a) 48 previously presented and 60 previously never presented words, including 
four of the critical lures.  Children were instructed not to guess and to only say ‘yes’ to 
the words they are certain they heard, as per Roediger and McDermott’s (1995) 
instructions. Children were then administered the semantic knowledge matching test 
(participants 1-10) or the COWAT (the remaining 52 participants). Finally, they were 
debriefed on the nature of the study. Participants received a small compensation ($20) as 
a thank you for participating in the study. 
Results 
Data Analyses: Overview 
Because younger children tend to engage in positive response bias (saying yes) 
more often, raw hit rates for recognition may not always be appropriate (e.g., Brainerd et 
al., 2002). Therefore, a variation of signal detection will be used, specifically A’. 
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Snodgrass and Corwin (1988) first introduced this technique as a method for correcting 
biased responding in memory recognition tasks. These formulas result in a manner such 
that when A’ = 0.5, there is a lack of true recognition (accepting targets more often than 
distractors) or a lack of semantic false recognition (accepting distractors that foil the 
studied material over unrelated distractors). When A’ = 1, perfect true or false recognition 
exists. A’ will be calculated from participant responses on the recognition task. Of note 
for this study are the A’ for true positive responses (e.g., saying “Yes” when the word 
was previously presented, a “Hit”) and for false positives (e.g., saying “Yes” when the 
word was not previously presented, a “False Alarm”). 
Four separate multiple regressions were run to assess the relation between age, 
socioeconomic status (e.g., gross family income and parent education), cognitive 
abilities, and executive functioning on 1) proportion of critical lure production at recall, 
2) critical lure memory on the recognition task, 3) A’ for true positive responses and 4) A’ 
for false positive responses. When mediation analyses were indicated, stepwise 
regressions were used to identify socioeconomic status as a mediator in the relationship 
between measures of executive functioning and false memory. Predictors were normally 
distributed and fit the assumptions necessary for regression analyses.  
Immediate False Memories: Free Recall Memory Accuracy 
Table 2 includes means and standard deviations for participant tasks. To assess 
immediate false memory recall, the proportion of critical lures remembered during recall 
was calculated. The proportion was calculated to take into account the number of words 
accurately remembered during recall as well. For example, if a child remembered 35 of 
the 48 possible words, and also remember 3 of the critical lures, then the proportion of 
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critical lure recall would be .0789 (e.g., 3/38). Higher proportions represent increased 
false memory for critical lures. Results of the regression analysis suggested that each of 
the measured aspects of intellectual ability, as well as performance on the Animal Sorting 
subtest of the NEPSY-II and mother’s highest degree achieved were related to critical 
lure recall proportion. Age of the participant (entered as a categorical variable to assess 
whether developmental reversals of false memory exist in this sample) did not appear to 
predict performance on the free recall task (t = -.955, p = .348). Better performance on 
Vocabulary and Matrix Reasoning predicted higher critical lure proportion (Vocabulary: t 
= 2.572, p  = .016; Matrix Reasoning: t = 2.543, p = .017). Interestingly, higher overall 
FSIQ-2 predicted lower critical lure recall (t = -2.662, p = .013). On the Animal Sorting 
subtest, the total number of correct sorts was predictive of higher critical lure recall 
proportion (t = 2.158, p = .040). Finally, higher maternal educational achievement was 
predictive of higher critical lure recall proportion (t = 2.683, p = .012). Table 3 
summarizes the results of these analyses. All of the other aspects of executive functioning 
(e.g., other scales on the Inhibition subtest, Digit Span Backwards), as well as the results 
of the COWAT, revealed non-significant predictive value. 
Due to the significant relation of the measures of executive functioning (e.g., 
Animal Sorting number of correct sorts scaled score) and mother’s education to critical 
lure recall proportion, early steps to test the assumptions of mediation analysis were 
conducted with the executive functioning measure as the independent variable, mother’s 
education as the mediating variable, and critical lure recall as the dependent variable. 
However, in these analyses, none of the predictor variables were significantly related to 
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critical lure recall on their own (all ps > .05), suggesting that this mediation was not 
appropriate (Figure 1). 
Delayed False Memories for the Critical Lure: Recognition 
 As a method of assessing delayed false memories, the number of critical lures that 
were responded to with a positive (Yes) response was calculated. This positive response 
was indicative of the participant saying they had heard the critical lure previously on the 
word lists. Thus, a higher number of critical lures recognized during this task would 
suggest more false memories. No significant predictions emerged from this analysis in 
regards to age, socioeconomic status, executive functioning, or semantic knowledge 
(Table 6). 
Hit Rate on Recognition 
 Signal detection was used to calculate the “Hit” rate (e.g., accurate identification) 
on the recognition task. Again, signal detection was used to take into the account the 
tendency of young children towards a positive response bias (e.g., Brainerd et al., 2002). 
The resulting proportion from the signal detection correction was used as the outcome 
variable. In these analyses, only age and gross family income emerged as significant 
predictors of Hit rate. Specifically, older participants tended to have higher “Hit” rates 
than younger children (t = 2.316, p = .028). Additionally, participants whose families had 
higher gross family income had lower Hit rates (t = -3.011, p = .006). No significant 
predictions emerged for any measures of executive functioning or semantic knowledge 
(Table 7). 
False Alarm Rate on Recognition 
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 Signal detection was also used to calculate the False Alarm rate (e.g., false 
memories) on the recognition task. Again, the resulting proportion from the signal 
detection correction was used as the outcome variable. In these analyses, only the 
Inhibition Switching Combined score on the NEPSY-II showed predictive capabilities. 
Participants who performed better on this aspect of the Inhibition subtest showed fewer 
false memories on the delay (t = -2.260, p = .032). No significant predictions emerged for 
any other measures of executive functioning, age, socioeconomic status, or semantic 
knowledge (Table 8). 
Discussion 
 This study aimed at evaluating the effects that executive functioning may have on 
false memory production. Multiple instances where executive functioning was an 
important predictor of false memory are highlighted by the current results. These results 
could shed light on different methods to use or actions to take when engaging children in 
a forensic interview following their witnessing of a crime. 
 Results were mixed in regards to executive functioning. Cognitive flexibility and 
inhibition were both predictive of false recognition. The total number of sorts identified 
in the Animal Sorting subtest of the NEPSY-II predicted critical lure recall, with higher 
scores being associated with increased false recall. This may suggest that children who 
were less rigid in their approach to the Animal Sorting task (i.e., children who had more 
cognitive flexibility) may have more fluidly recalled words without attending to whether 
they were actually heard or if they were just similar, semantically. This approach may 
make children more prone to memory errors. This result can also be viewed from the lens 
of Fuzzy Trace Theory; participants who identified more themes (i.e., the “gist”) had 
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higher false recall. In regards to inhibition, children who performed well on Inhibition 
Switching Combined (which combines the scaled scores of completion time and errors) 
had fewer false memories at recognition. This task is incredibly complex and requires 
strong inhibitory skills. Thus, this subset of children who performed well on this task 
were also well set up to be able to discount the critical lure and have fewer false 
memories at recognition. Working memory appeared to play no significant role with this 
sample of participants. However, the use of Digit Span backwards as a measure of 
working memory is limited. 
Critical lure proportion at recall was predicted by all aspects of IQ measurement. 
Better performance on both the Vocabulary and the Matrix Reasoning scales predicted 
higher proportion of critical lure memory (i.e., higher false memory rates) immediately 
after words were presented. One explanation could be that if a child has a more extensive 
vocabulary, they may make connections between words more easily, thus leading to the 
critical lure memory when it was not presented. This finding was also noted in previous 
research as well (e.g., Howe, Toth, & Cicchetti, 2011). The similar association between 
the visuospatial subtest of Matrix Reasoning could be explained by children creating 
some sort of visual representation of the words they are attempting to remember. 
Children with higher visuospatial skills could have thus been creating some sort of 
pictorial representation of the words and associating them in a similar manner. This result 
would actually be in opposition to previous studies noting that lower perceptual IQ is 
associated with increased false memory, though at recognition (Zhu, 2010a). The 
immediacy of false memory at recall may be an important factor here. 
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Surprisingly, false memories at recall and recognition were not related to normed 
results on the COWAT. Previous research with adults had suggested that semantic 
fluency would be important in recognition (e.g., Koutsaal et al., 2003). Given that no 
studies have been done to assess this relationship prior to the current study and because, 
intuitively, this relationship seems reasonable, future research should continue to consider 
semantic fluency as a potential predictor to false memories.  
Children with a lower overall FSIQ-2 predicted higher critical lure memory at 
recall. This is especially interesting considering the two scales which comprise FSIQ-2 
(Vocabulary and Matrix Reasoning) were associated with critical lure memory in the 
opposite direction. This may be due to the additive nature of how FSIQ-2 is calculated. 
Individually, having higher scores on Vocabulary and Matrix Reasoning resulted in lower 
critical lure memory, but those participants who were high on both subtests tended to 
remember the critical lure more often. Zhu (2010a) noted that having a lower IQ was 
associated with higher false memory at recognition. Again, the immediacy of false recall 
could be the reason for this difference. 
 Our hypothesis for age being an important predictor of false memory was partially 
supported. Specifically, there was no significant relationship noted between age and 
critical lure recall. Thus, there were no developmental reversals in false memory 
observed in this sample (Holliday et al., 2011). An age difference in recognition accuracy 
was revealed with older children having a higher “Hit” rate than younger children. This 
result is consistent with previous research showing that older children and adults have a 
larger general memory capacity than younger children (Howe, Toth, & Cicchetti, 2011; 
Metzger et al., 2008).  
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 A major strength of this study was the method in which socioeconomic status was 
assessed. Rather than combining different important aspects of socioeconomic status into 
a single score, gross family income, maternal, and paternal education were included as 
individual variables in analyses to assess their unique contribution to outcomes. As a 
result of this method, the relationship between critical lure proportion recall and maternal 
education was identified. However, no major differences were noted on any aspect of 
socioeconomic status for false memories at recognition. This is in contrast to the findings 
of Howe and colleagues (2004). This difference may be due to the manner in which 
socioeconomic status was defined, as Howe and colleagues (2004) grouped participants 
based on low- or middle-socioeconomic status. This grouping was based purely on need 
for public assistance, however, and did not grasp at other aspects of SES (e.g., education). 
Additionally, despite this relationship emerging between critical lure recall proportion, an 
aspect of executive functioning (e.g., Animal Sorting Number of Sorts) and maternal 
education, there was no significant mediation to speak of. This points to other variables 
potentially driving this relationship that were unmeasured (e.g., other aspects of 
socioeconomic status like cost-of-living, hours worked by parents, or per capita income) 
and begs for future investigation.  
This study is not without limitations. There were location differences noted 
between children recruited from West Virginia and children recruited from Vermont. 
Specifically, children from the Morgantown community were older and tended to have 
mothers who were more highly educated (ps < .05). A sampling bias may be to blame for 
these differences given that several of the participants from the Morgantown community 
were University-affiliated.  However, despite these location differences, there were no 
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differences between these two locations in regards to any of the outcome variables 
measured. Further, this group was limited in racial/ethnic diversity and came from 
primarily well-educated, higher socioeconomic status backgrounds. Compared to 
previous studies, the children in this study also performed more accurately (Metzger et 
al., 2008). More studies in this area should include a broader sample of children and 
adolescents so stronger conclusions can be drawn. 
 This study did not assess for specific environmental factors that may affect 
memory, aside from previous head injury, mental health diagnosis, anoxia/hypoxia, and 
socioeconomic status. Other areas to consider for future research may include prenatal 
drug or alcohol exposure, specific instances of trauma, typical sleep quality/quantity, and 
chronic medical problems. There was also no specific assessment of effort with 
participants, so it is difficult to say whether participants were performing at their best 
aside from clinical judgment. This could be solved in the future with a brief version of 
the word recognition tests used in this study, much like the Test of Memory Malingering 
(TOMM; Tombaugh, 1996). DeRight and Carone’s (2015) recently published review on 
effort testing in children made recommendations regarding the use of these tests, which 
are often ignored with children and pediatric populations. Additionally, a parent-report of 
executive functioning [e.g., the Behavior Rating Inventory of Executive Functioning 
(BRIEF); Gioia et al., 2000] may have provided beneficial information should children 
have been giving low effort. 
Child temperament may also be an important aspect that went unmeasured in this 
study. Temperament is defined as the method in which a child regulates processes and 
their reactivity to situations (Rothbart & Derryberry, 1981). Considering the higher-order 
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nature of these processes (much like those involved in executive functioning) this would 
be important to consider in future research. Noguera and colleagues (2015) found that 
children with better inhibition skills attended to words they were supposed to remember 
longer than words they were supposed to ignore, whereas children low in this trait 
attended to these words equally.  
Measurement of executive functioning and IQ were limited in this study. The 
WASI-II two-subtest measure of IQ is brief; this is beneficial for research purposes, but 
may not have been the most comprehensive way to measure IQ. The use of this brief IQ 
measure may also have been the reason for the strange findings regarding IQ and recall. 
Additionally, the NEPSY-II assesses two aspects of executive functioning: inhibition and 
cognitive flexibility. The addition of the WISC-IV Digit Span subtest added a working 
memory measure for this study. There are many of aspects of executive functioning (e.g., 
initiation, planning, attention) that may be important in the creation of false memories 
and should be considered in future studies. 
 These results point to the importance of aspects of executive functioning in false 
memory production. Further research is needed to point to practical and logistic 
implications of these results in child witness interviewing. All children should be 
interviewed using the most empirically validated forensic methods (e.g., the Cognitive 
Interview; Fisher & Geiselman, 1992; Geiselman, Fisher, MacKinnon, & Holland, 1985) 
but this may become increasingly important for children who may be lower than their 
peers in aspects of intelligence and executive functioning. 
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Table 1: Demographics by Age Group 
Table 1 
Demographics by Age Group 
  Younger Children 
(n = 28) 
Older Children 
(n = 31) 
 Total Sample 
N (%)  n % n % 
Gender       
Male 32 (54.2) 15  53.6 17 54.8 
Female 27 (45.8) 13 46.4 14 45.2 
Handedness      
Right 54 (91.5) 26 92.9 28 90.3 
Left 5 (8.5) 2 7.1 3 9.7 
Ethnicity      
Caucasian 55 (93.2) 26 92.9 29 93.5 
Hispanic/Latino 1 (1.7) 1 3.6 0 0 
Biracial 3 (5.1) 1 3.6 2 6.5 
Gross Family Income       
$0-$14,999 1 (1.7) 0 0 1 3.2 
$15,000-$29,999 2 (3.4) 1 3.6 1 3.2 
$30,000-$44,999 3 (5.1) 2 7.1 1 3.2 
$45,000-$59,999 6 (10.2) 2 7.1 4 12.9 
$60,000-$74,999 3 (5.1) 2 7.1 1 3.2 
$75,000-$89,999 8 (13.6) 4 14.3 4 12.9 
$90,000-$99,000 6 (10.2) 1 3.6 5 16.1 
$100,000-$124,999 8 (13.6) 5 17.9 3 9.7 
$125,000-$149,999 10 (16.9) 4 14.3 6 19.4 
$150,000-$174,999 4 (6.8) 2 7.1 2 6.5 
$200,000 and over 8 (13.6) 5 17.9 3 9.7 
Mother’s Highest 
Degree  
     
High school diploma 10 (16.9) 5 17.9 5 16.1 
Associates 3 (5.1) 2 7.1 1 3.2 
4-year college degree 21 (35.6) 9 32.1 12 38.7 
Master’s degree 19 (32.2) 10 35.7 9 29 
JD/MD/Ph.D. 6 (10.2) 2 7.1 4 12.9 
Father’s Highest 
Degree  
     
Less than high school 1 (1.7) 1 3.6 0 0 
High school diploma 11 (18.6) 3 10.7 8 25.8 
Associates 9 (15.3) 4 14.3 5 16.1 
4-year college degree 23 (39.0) 17 60.7 6 19.4 
Master’s degree 9 (15.3) 2 7.1 7 22.6 
JD/MD/Ph.D. 5 (8.5) 1 3.6 1 12.9 
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Table 2: Means and Standard Deviations of Research Tasks 
Table 2 
Means and Standard Deviations of Research Tasks 
  Younger 
Children 
(n = 28) 
 
Older Children 
(n = 31) 
 Total Sample 
M (SD)  M SD M SD 
WASI-II1,2       
Vocabulary 57.98 (8.57) 57.50  9.18 58.42 8.12 
Matrix Reasoning 52.27 (8.61) 51.50 8.38 52.97 8.89 




     
Animal Sorting: 
Scaled Score 
11.37 (3.60) 11.82 4.32 10.97 2.81 
Animal Sorting: 
Number of Sorts 
Scaled Score 



























DRM Lists      
Recall 35.39 (5.18) 32.54 4.80 37.97 4.09 
Recognition3: True 
Positive 
17.32 (2.90) 16.50 3.34 18.06 2.24 
Recognition3: True 
Negative 
77.39 (6.77) 77.43 5.43 77.35 7.88 
Recognition3: False 
Positive 
9.61 (6.77) 9.57 5.43 9.65 7.88 
Recognition3: False 
Negative 
3.68 (2.90) 4.5 3.34 2.94 2.24 
COWAT: Animals 17.76 (5.34) 15.5 5.33 20.30 4.14 
Note 1: WASI-II, NEPSY-II, and WISC-IV M= 10, SD= 3; Note 2: FSIQ M = 100, SD = 15;                                                                        
Note 2: Previously presented words: 21; Unpresented words: 87 
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Table 5: Summary of Multiple Regression: Proportion of Critical Lure Production at 
Recall 
Table 5      
Summary of Multiple Regression Analysis for Proportion of Critical Lure Production at Recall 
(N = 59) 
Variable B SE(B) β t Sig. (p) 
WASI-II      
Vocabulary Scaled Score 
 
.037 .014 8.914 2.572 .016 
Matrix Reasoning Scaled 
Score 
 
.037 .014 8.668 2.543 .017 
FSIQ-2 -.044 .016 -15.277 -2.662 .013 
NEPSY-II: Animal Sorting      
Scaled Score 
 -.012 .007 -1.353 -1.838 .077 
Total Number of Sorts 
Scaled Score .015 .007 1.619 2.158 .040 
NEPSY-II: Inhibition      
Total Errors Scaled Score 
 -.002 .008 -.166 -.275 .786 
Naming Combined Scaled 
Score 
 
.002 .003 .176 .651 .520 
Inhibition Combined Scaled 
Score 
 
.006 .005 .542 1.232 .229 
Switching Combined Scaled 
Score -.008 .006 -.569 -1.354 .187 
WISC-IV: Digit Span      
Scaled Score 
 -.008 .011 -.611 -.723 .476 
Forward Scaled Score 
 .001 .007 .043 .073 .942 
Backward Scaled Score .005 .006 .334 .716 .480 
Age 
 -.012 .012 -.169 -.955 .348 
Gross Family Income 
 -.001 .002 -.051 -.273 .787 
Maternal Highest Degree 
 .016 .006 .549 2.683 .012 
Paternal Highest Degree 
 -.004 .006 -.130 -.641 .527 
COWAT: Animals Z-score 
 .003 .004 .146 .811 .424 
Note: FSIQ-2 = Full Scale IQ, 2 subtest 
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Table 6: Summary of Multiple Regression: Critical Lures at Recognition 
Table 6      
Summary of Multiple Regression Analysis for Critical Lures Remembered at Recognition 
 (N = 59) 
Variable B SE(B) β t Sig. (p) 
WASI-II      
Vocabulary Scaled Score 
 .253 .585 1.895 .433 .669 
Matrix Reasoning Scaled 
Score 
 
.199 .587 1.459 .339 .737 
FSIQ-2 -.283 .670 -3.067 -.423 .676 
NEPSY-II: Animal Sorting      
Scaled Score 
 -.394 .269 -1.364 -1.467 .154 
Total Number of Sorts 
Scaled Score .422 .288 1.390 1.466 .154 
NEPSY-II: Inhibition      
Total Errors Scaled Score 
 .161 .332 .370 .486 .631 
Naming Combined Scaled 
Score 
 
-.067 .115 -.200 -.585 .563 
Inhibition Combined Scaled 
Score 
 
.073 .205 .199 .358 .723 
Switching Combined Scaled 
Score -.362 .234 -.824 -1.551 .133 
WISC-IV: Digit Span      
Scaled Score 
 -.110 .463 -.253 -.237 .814 
Forward Scaled Score 
 -.083 .298 -.207 -.277 .784 
Backward Scaled Score .084 .259 .191 .323 .749 
Age 
 -.835 .498 -.374 -1.675 .106 
Gross Family Income 
 -.030 .093 -.076 -.319 .752 
Maternal Highest Degree 
 .105 .240 .113 .436 .667 
Paternal Highest Degree 
 .058 .245 .060 .235 .816 
COWAT: Animals Z-score 
 .140 .164 .194 .856 .400 
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Table 7: Summary of Multiple Regression: Correct Hits at Recognition 
Table 7      
Summary of Multiple Regression Analysis for Correct Hits at Recognition (N = 59) 
Variable B SE(B) β t Sig. (p) 
WASI-II      
Vocabulary Scaled Score 
 .035 .054 2.267 .647 .523 
Matrix Reasoning Scaled 
Score 
 
.026 .054 1.679 .487 .630 
FSIQ-2 -.034 .061 -3.201 -.551 .586 
NEPSY-II: Animal Sorting      
Scaled Score 
 -.005 .025 -.163 -.219 .828 
Total Number of Sorts 
Scaled Score .023 .026 .658 .867 .394 
NEPSY-II: Inhibition      
Total Errors Scaled Score 
 -.001 .030 -.027 -.044 .965 
Naming Combined Scaled 
Score 
 
.005 .011 .137 .500 .621 
Inhibition Combined Scaled 
Score 
 
.010 .019 .246 .552 .585 
Switching Combined Scaled 
Score -.019 .021 -.368 -.866 .394 
WISC-IV: Digit Span      
Scaled Score 
 .004 .042 .076 .089 .930 
Forward Scaled Score 
 -.010 .027 -.221 -.370 .714 
Backward Scaled Score .011 .024 .218 .462 .648 
Age 
 .106 .046 .414 2.316 .028 
Gross Family Income 
 -.026 .009 -.571 -3.011 .006 
Maternal Highest Degree 
 .029 .022 .273 1.319 .198 
Paternal Highest Degree 
 .001 .022 .013 .062 .951 
COWAT: Animals Z-score 
 .025 .015 .302 1.663 .108 
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Table 8: Summary of Multiple Regression: False Alarms (Memories) at Recognition 
 
Table 8      
Summary of Multiple Regression Analysis for False Alarms at Recognition (N = 59) 
Variable B SE(B) β t Sig. (p) 
WASI-II      
Vocabulary Scaled Score 
 .023 .042 2.588 .548 .588 
Matrix Reasoning Scaled 
Score 
 
.022 .042 2.366 .510 .614 
FSIQ-2 -.027 .048 -4.374 -.560 .580 
NEPSY-II: Animal Sorting      
Scaled Score 
 -.029 .019 -1.507 -1.504 .144 
Total Number of Sorts 
Scaled Score .030 .021 1.504 1.471 .153 
NEPSY-II: Inhibition      
Total Errors Scaled Score 
 .028 .024 .954 1.161 .256 
Naming Combined Scaled 
Score 
 
-.010 .008 -.448 -1.218 .234 
Inhibition Combined Scaled 
Score 
 
.003 .015 .105 .176 .862 
Switching Combined Scaled 
Score -.038 .017 -1.294 -2.260 .032 
WISC-IV: Digit Span      
Scaled Score 
 -.009 .033 -.311 -.270 .789 
Forward Scaled Score 
 .000 .021 .006 .008 .994 
Backward Scaled Score .006 .019 .197 .310 .759 
Age 
 -.006 .036 -.041 -.172 .865 
Gross Family Income 
 -.006 .007 -.238 -.931 .360 
Maternal Highest Degree 
 .013 .017 .212 .761 .453 
Paternal Highest Degree 
 .000 .018 .003 .012 .990 
COWAT: Animals Z-score 
 .015 .012 .312 1.278 .212 
 
